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Revisiting the Relationship between Contract Governance and 1	
Contractors’ Opportunistic Behavior in Construction Projects 2	
Abstract: Contracts act as a major tool in curbing opportunism, which is common 3	
phenomenon in construction projects. This research differentiates contractual 4	
mechanisms of obligatoriness, monitoring and coordination, and studies the 5	
relationship between complexity of above functions and different types of 6	
opportunistic behavior. Using data from 262 owners (the party issuing the contract) in 7	
Chinese construction industry, this research reveals that contractual obligatoriness has 8	
negative effect on strong form opportunistic behavior, while contractual monitoring 9	
and coordination have positive and negative effect on weak form opportunistic 10	
behavior, respectively. Furthermore, we find that goodwill trust acts as a mediator in 11	
explaining contractual coordination’s effect on weak form opportunistic behavior. 12	
This research makes contributions to both the contract management literature and the 13	
interorganizational relationship governance literature by providing more nuanced 14	
findings that speak to the debate surrounding the relationship between contractual 15	
governance and opportunistic behavior, and elaborate the mediation mechanism and 16	
provide insights into the contractual function view.   17	
Managerial relevance statement: This research has two managerial implications. 18	
Firstly, it provides guidance for contract designing. Conventional wisdom posits that 19	
managers should design more explicit contracts to curb both parties’ opportunistic 20	
behavior. However, this research indicates that construction companies should be 21	
cautious in using different contractual functions. On the one hand, the binding force 22	
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of the contract should be strengthened appropriately to generate deterrent force 23	
through obligatoriness. On the other hand, managers should pay attention to 24	
monitoring-based contractual provisions which have the potential of nurturing 25	
contractors’ opportunistic behavior in weak form. Owners should let coordination go 26	
with them to reduce weak form opportunism from motivation. Since the improvement 27	
process of contracting may curb opportunistic behavior in some ways, learning from 28	
previous contracts, especially failed ones, is encouraged for owners. Secondly, 29	
contract managers should keep a weather eye on practical behaviors or conflicts 30	
derived from opportunism and employ pointed mechanism. With regard to mitigating 31	
contractors’ weak form opportunistic behavior, relational governance like trust is 32	
more preferable. Coordination efforts or shared norms should be developed and 33	
enhanced through contracts or someway else in dealing with this type of opportunistic 34	
behavior, which is less observable but more durable.  35	
Keywords: Contract governance, contractual complexity, opportunistic behavior, 36	
goodwill trust, construction projects 37	
Introduction 38	
Opportunism that can result in disruptions and conflicts is viewed as a barrier to 39	
the success of inter-organizational transactions, such as constructions projects 40	
(Boukendour, 2007; Cheung and Yiu, 2006). Contracts, using control and 41	
coordination mechanisms typically (e.g. Dekker, 2004; Mellewigt et al., 2007), serve 42	
as a main instrument for dealing with opportunistic behavior (e.g. Wei et al., 2017). 43	
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Although how contract design impacts opportunistic behavior has gained considerable 44	
research attention (e.g. Cavusgil et al., 2004; John, 1984; Liu et al., 2009), consistent 45	
findings are far from being reached.  46	
Some empirical studies have found that, by making the exchange contractually 47	
explicit and specifying precise behavioral boundaries before the exchange, the 48	
detailed contract is viewed as the major instrument that protects specific investments 49	
from opportunistic behavior (e.g. Parkhe, 1993; Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Liu et 50	
al., 2009). However, there are also empirical studies confirming that contractual 51	
governance has no significant effect on opportunism (Cavusgil et al., 2004; Lu et al., 52	
2014). Besides, another point of view has suggested that perceptions of increased 53	
formalization and controls, like rule enforcement and surveillance, may lead to an 54	
erosion of positive attitudes and consequently to more opportunism (Ghoshal and 55	
Moran, 1996; John, 1984). With these inconsistent conclusions, it is still not clear 56	
how opportunism can be effectively governed using contracts. 57	
This research revisits the relationship between contractual governance and 58	
opportunistic behaviors in the construction project context, and aims at seeking for 59	
explanation and conciliation for these contradictory findings. We argue that one driver 60	
for the inconsistency in the literature is that some studies may have just focused on a 61	
certain aspect of the constructs (i.e. the contract design features and opportunism) but 62	
drawn a conclusion at the overall level, while neither contractual governance or 63	
opportunistic behavior is single-facet. To clarify the relationship between the design 64	
feature of the contract and opportunism, one possible way is to investigate the 65	
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relevant constructs in a more nuanced way by taking different aspects of contract 66	
design and opportunism into consideration. 67	
For opportunism, Luo’s (2006) conceptual study has addressed the dimensions of 68	
strong and weak forms of opportunism, and empirical studies have strengthened the 69	
necessity of subtle research (Lumineau and Quelin, 2012; Luo et al., 2015). It is 70	
important to investigate the different effects of governance mechanisms in restraining 71	
each form of opportunistic behavior in construction projects. On the other hand, 72	
contracts may show divergent design features in different dimensions. Building on the 73	
previous studies that analyze the control and coordination mechanisms of the contract 74	
(e.g. Lumineau and Quelin, 2012) and taking a step further, this research argues that 75	
contractual control itself may have different effects (Heide et al., 2007) when it comes 76	
to contractors’ opportunistic behavior in construction projects. Inspired by the 77	
management control literature which distinguishes between the different properties of 78	
behavior-based control and outcome-based control and receives fruitful research 79	
insights (Bai et al., 2016; Jensen and Meckling, 1992), we argue that contractual 80	
control has two different mechanisms, namely obligatoriness and monitoring, that 81	
may exert different effects on contractors’ opportunism. Adding contractual 82	
coordination, the design features of construction contracts are thus examined from 83	
three aspects in this research.  84	
To sum up, this paper aims to reconcile the aforementioned inconsistency and 85	
address the following research question: How do the design features of contracts’ 86	
different dimensions influence the occurrence of different types of contractor’s 87	
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opportunistic behavior in a construction project? Using a survey dataset of 262 88	
responses from clients in the Chinese construction industry, we find that contractual 89	
obligatoriness can effectively curb contractor’s strong form opportunistic behaviors. 90	
Whilst, contractual monitoring will induce more weak form opportunistic behaviors, 91	
and the coordination function of the contact can help deal with weak form 92	
opportunism. In addition, we found evidence that goodwill trust between the client 93	
and the contractor plays a significant role in explaining the influence of contractual 94	
coordination on contractor’s weak form opportunistic behaviors.  95	
This research contributes to the contract management literature by distinguishing 96	
the control function of formal contracts into contractual obligatoriness and monitoring, 97	
and argue that they have different properties in governing interorganizational 98	
transactions. This research also makes contributions to the interorganizational 99	
relationship governance literature by showing how each aspect of formal contracts 100	
influence different types of opportunistic behaviors. The conclusions of this paper 101	
thus provide more nuanced knowledge regarding the discussion on 102	
contract-opportunism relationship in the current literature.  103	
 104	
Theoretical background  105	
Opportunistic behavior 106	
Defined as “self-interest seeking with guile”, opportunism is a central concept in 107	
the study of transaction cost and is especially important for economic activities that 108	
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involve asset specificity (Williamson, 1985). Previous conceptualization like “lying, 109	
stealing, cheating, and calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or 110	
otherwise confuse” (Williamson, 1985) has been described as “blatant” opportunism 111	
(Masten 1988). In contrast, the term “lawful opportunism” is used to define deceitful 112	
behavior that doesn’t pertain to the formal contract (Wathne and Heide, 2000). 113	
Similarly, Luo (2006) differentiates weak form opportunism from strong form. In this 114	
research, contractors’ opportunistic behavior is defined as “behaviors aimed at 115	
pursuing self-interest with deceit to achieve gains at the expense of the owner by 116	
withdrawing promises, shirking obligations, and breaching explicit or implicit 117	
agreements” (Das and Rahman, 2010; Lu et al., 2016; Luo, 2006), and it is viewed as 118	
a two-aspect construct. Strong form opportunistic behavior includes actions that 119	
violate contractual norms (terms, clauses, and conditions) that are explicitly codified 120	
in the main body of a contract as well as in its supplements (Luo, 2006, 2015), 121	
whereas weak form opportunistic behavior involves behaviors that violate relational 122	
norms not spelled out in a contract but embedded in the common understanding of 123	
both parties (Luo, 2006, 2015). 124	
With high complexity and asset specificity, construction projects are minefields 125	
for opportunistic behavior (Pang et al., 2015). Due to information asymmetry, 126	
behaviors like underbidding or lying are common in construction projects (Wang et 127	
al., 2007), making adverse selection a serious problem. This research focuses on 128	
contractors’ ex-post opportunistic behavior, namely moral hazard problems like 129	
withholding or distorting information, shirking obligations, and reneging on explicit 130	
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or implicit commitments during the contract period. Moreover, contractors may make 131	
use of uncertainty and owners’ vulnerability to delay or even strike to receive a 132	
compromise from the owner, causing hold-up problems (Chang and Ive, 2007). It is 133	
also common to find contractors making use of the loopholes in the contract to raise 134	
claims and recoup loss due to excessive risk-taking (Pang et al., 2015). Unclear work 135	
scope, insufficient details or missing items all lead to opportunism (Pang et al., 2015), 136	
especially weak form opportunism that cheats at the margins. Thus, it is imperative 137	
for project owners to establish effective governance mechanisms to safeguard from 138	
contractors’ opportunistic behavior and reduce ex-post transaction costs. 139	
Contractual governance and the dimensions 140	
Contracts are the prominent governance mechanism to safeguard against 141	
opportunism and minimize the transaction cost (Williamson, 1985). For construction 142	
projects, devising appropriate contracts is essential to construction project success. 143	
Many researches have explored the role of contracts in construction projects. What 144	
has been frequently discussed is the effect of different contract type choices (e.g. 145	
guaranteed maximum price contracts, fixed price contracts, time and materials types 146	
of contracts) on project performance (e.g. Chan, et al., 2012; Jørgensen et al., 2017; 147	
Suprapto et al., 2016; Turner and Simister, 2001) and bidder competitiveness 148	
(Chapman and Ward, 2008; Drew and Skitmore, 1997), as well as the influence of 149	
some specific terms and clauses and contract features on risk reduction (Hutchens, 150	
1992), flexibility (Demirel et al., 2017) and other aspects of projects. Another steam 151	
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of research relating to contracts in construction projects focuses on mechanism design 152	
which aims to devise approaches and incentives to realize optimal outcomes or make 153	
participants behave in a desired manner (e.g., Boukendour, 2007; Boukendour and 154	
Bah, 2001; Mahdi Hosseinian and Carmichael, 2014).  155	
Beyond the traditional concerns and perspectives above, some research moves to 156	
a more broad and strategic direction, treating contract as a formal mechanism to 157	
govern the relationship and behavior between collaborating parties to explore the 158	
relationship between contract strategy and project performance (e.g. Ke et al., 2013), 159	
and the synergy between contract and other governance mechanisms (e.g. Oliveira 160	
and Lumineau, 2017). Recently, with the development of contractual function 161	
perspective in inter-organizational transaction research field, much attention has been 162	
drawn to the multiple aspects of contracts (e.g. Benaroch et al., 2016; Malhotra and 163	
Lumineau, 2011). This appeals to scholars to investigate the level of complexity of 164	
contractual functions in various industrial sectors, including in the context of 165	
construction projects (Gao et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2017; You et al., 2018). A more 166	
complex contract would offer better guidelines for solving ex-post problems (Reuer 167	
and Arino, 2007), and the complexity of contracts has long been studied (e.g. 168	
Barthélemy and Quélin, 2006; Ding et al., 2013; Reuer and Arino, 2007; Wuyts and 169	
Geyskens, 2005).  170	
Contracts are designed to mitigate inter-organizational risks like relational risks, 171	
which refer to the possibility that partners do not act cooperatively owing to 172	
misaligned interests, and performance risks, which refer to the possibility that the 173	
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objective of the transaction could still be under-realized even with full cooperation 174	
(Das and Teng, 2001). In the presence of opportunism or relational risks, transaction 175	
parties have to elaborate contracts to monitor behaviors, safeguard assets, and ensure 176	
that both parties fulfill their responsibilities. In particular, empirical research on TCE 177	
emphasizes the control function of contracts in safeguarding against opportunism 178	
(Benaroch et al., 2016; Schepker et al., 2014). In the meantime, researchers have a 179	
broader view of contracts and extend the function of contracts to coordination (Klein 180	
Woolthuis et al., 2005; Mellewigt et al. 2007; Reuer and Ariño 2007) in dealing with 181	
performance risks that derives from the misaligned expectation rather than misaligned 182	
interest (Gulati et al., 2012). In this research, we argue that contractual coordination 183	
also has the potential of dealing with some kinds of relational risk. We use contractual 184	
coordination to refer to the level of detail of the contract terms incorporated to align 185	
the expectations of transacting parties, avoid “honest mistakes”, and minimize 186	
inefficiencies (Mayer and Argyres, 2004). 187	
Inspired by the management control literature, in this research we intend to 188	
distinguish the control function of formal contracts in a more nuanced way. The 189	
management control literature has long documented two different ways of control, 190	
namely outcome control and behavior control (Anderson and Oliver, 1987; Dekker, 191	
2004; Liu, 2015). Outcome control refers to the approach using explicit goals of 192	
outcome to reward or punish the parties, while behavior control relies more on 193	
monitoring the process or activities (Anderson and Oliver, 1987; Bai et al., 2016). 194	
Differencing these two ways of control is important as they may have different 195	
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influence on subsequent transactions. For example, Bai et al., (2016) show that 196	
outcome-based and behavior-based contract have divergent effect on buy-supply 197	
conflict in supply chains. 198	
We argue that these two different control approaches reflect different 199	
philosophies in formal contracts. For example, in a construction contract, it can be 200	
stipulated that the client should pay to the contractor at some milestones, or the client 201	
will get punished if they fail to pay on time. The contract can also stipulate what kind 202	
of project quality should be delivered, or the contractor will be punished if the quality 203	
does not meet the requirements. In this way of explicitly delineating the goals as well 204	
as the according rights or punishments, the transacting parties are exploiting the 205	
benefit of easy-enforceability of using a formal contract (Cao and Lumineau, 2015). 206	
Once the rights and obligations are clearly defined, the collaborating parties are 207	
actually relying on the legal system to protect the transaction. We name this way of 208	
contractual control as contractual obligatoriness, and suggest that the extent to which 209	
the contract party is restrained by the binding force of the contract is varied (Luo, 210	
2006).  211	
On the other hand, the collaborating parties can stipulate in the contract how one 212	
party monitors the other’s behaviors. For example, in a construction contract, the 213	
client can incorporate his right to monitor the contractor’s behavior in realizing major 214	
goals of a construction project, including cost, time, quality, or health, safety, and 215	
environment (HSE). Using this way of control, the collaborating parties are not 216	
directly benefiting from the easy-enforceability of the formal contract, but using 217	
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contract to justify the surveillance right of one party on the process or activities of the 218	
partner. In this way, the controlling party is benefiting from its own monitoring effort. 219	
We name this way of control in a formal contract as contractual monitoring, and argue 220	
that the extent to which the owner’s rights to observe its contractors are codified in 221	
the contract is varied (Kashyap and Murtha, 2016; Reuer and Ariño 2007).  222	
As will be discussed in more detail in the next section, it is relevant to our 223	
research purpose to distinguish between these two approaches because they will exert 224	
very different effects on contractors’ opportunistic behaviors. For this research, we 225	
use contractual obligatoriness, contractual monitoring, and contractual coordination to 226	
represent the different governance approaches in a formal contract.  227	
 228	
Hypotheses development 229	
Lusch and Brown (1996) suggest that contracts will undoubtedly influence 230	
behavior. Existing research on the effect of contracts on contractor’s opportunistic 231	
behavior in construction projects reach inconsistent conclusions. Some research 232	
reveals that contracts prevent contractor’s opportunistic behavior (You et al., 2018). 233	
On the other hand, contracts are found in other research to make no difference in 234	
mitigating opportunism (Lu et al., 2015). Lu et al. (2016) have found that different 235	
contract dimensions exert different effects on contractor’s opportunistic behavior. We 236	
agree that the contract is a governance mechanism with multiple dimensions, each of 237	
which has its unique purpose and features, thus have different governance effect. 238	
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A party’s opportunistic behavior results from both its motivation to do so and its 239	
capability of doing so without being detected and sanctioned (Dong et al., 2014). 240	
Nooteboom (1996) mentioned three ways to mitigate rational risks. Firstly, 241	
monitoring to detect cheating and sanctions as a measure of enforcement are essential 242	
to restrict chances for opportunism. Secondly, incentive control is necessary to limit 243	
incentives to utilize opportunities for opportunism. Moreover, benevolence based on 244	
established social norms can limit inclinations towards opportunism (Klein Wolthuis 245	
et al., 2005). Combined with the view of contractual function mentioned above, 246	
hypotheses are developed in this research.  247	
The traditional TCE-based ‘safeguarding’ function is the very accepted 248	
motivation for writing contracts (Williamson, 1985). Complex obligatoriness clauses 249	
offer a way to safeguard against opportunistic behavior. Firstly, contracts define the 250	
parties’ obligations in black and white, specify acceptable behaviors and unacceptable 251	
behaviors (Lui and Ngo, 2004) and set the boundaries for the judgment of 252	
opportunistic behavior (Kashyap and Murtha, 2016). Secondly, contracts play an 253	
obligatory role in coping with appropriation concerns by providing incentives or clear 254	
sanctions in case of breach of contract, like penalties or liquidated damages for delay 255	
(Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005).  256	
In these ways, contractual obligatoriness, or the threat of legal enforcement 257	
reduces the capability of contractors to deviate from obligations codified in the formal 258	
contract (Lumineau and Quelin, 2012). What’s more, contractual obligatoriness 259	
changes the pay-off structure by increasing the cost of self-interest activities (Parkhe, 260	
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1993). When faced with opportunities of self-interest seeking, which might end up 261	
with serious consequences and loss, contractors may choose to abide by the contract 262	
after a cost-benefit analysis.  263	
Thus, strong form opportunistic behavior, which breaches the contractual norms 264	
(terms, clauses and conditions), can be effectively curbed by detailed contract drafting 265	
in terms of obligatoriness function (Lu et al., 2016). Thus, Hypothesis 1 is advanced: 266	
Hypothesis 1: Contractual obligatoriness is negatively associated with 267	
contractors’ strong form opportunistic behavior.  268	
Previous studies have suggested that incentives and penalties, as well as pricing 269	
and monitoring clauses like program and quality control should be included in 270	
contracts to restrict opportunism (Barthélemy and Quélin, 2006; Ujene, 2014). As the 271	
complexity of contractual monitoring increases, things related to observation and 272	
recording of performance become more convenient and transparent (Jensen and 273	
Meckling, 1992), narrowing the range around which contractors can seek self-interest 274	
with guile (Wathn and Heide, 2000). However, since the contractor’s motivation for 275	
opportunism still exists, contractors may be encouraged to cut corners in spaces that 276	
are left unspecified within the contracts, without being observed or sanctioned. As 277	
Ghoshal and Moran (1996) put it, “when the balloon of opportunistic behavior is 278	
poked in one place by the blunt instrument of control, it readily yields but re-emerges 279	
elsewhere in ways that may make it more difficult and costly to detect and curtail”. If 280	
the deviation behaviors would bring benefits without punishment, then the partner 281	
may seek self-interest in a less blatant way (Liu et al., 2014).  282	
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One important path that detailed monitoring in a contract induces more weak 283	
form opportunistic behaviors is through eroding goodwill trust between the client and 284	
the contractor. Goodwill trust refers to the degree of one’s reliability in a risky 285	
exchange situation, based on benevolence, good faith, and caring about another 286	
party’s welfare (Das and Teng, 2001; Nooteboom, 1996). Close monitoring in a 287	
formal contract may communicate a signal of distrust to the contractor, who is 288	
monitored by the owner through clauses regarding project quality or schedule. This 289	
type of surveillance-oriented governance mechanism may throw parties’ goodwill into 290	
doubt (Das and Teng, 2001; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996) and may further erodes the 291	
process of goodwill trust development (Malhotra and Lumineau, 2011; Schweitzer et 292	
al., 2016). This will stimulate the contractors’ sense of reactance for this obtrusive 293	
form of control (John, 1984; Kashyap et al., 2012) and promote inappropriate actions, 294	
especially actions that cannot be specified within contracts (Wuyts & Geyskens, 295	
2005). 296	
Therefore, we argue that although it can restrict the contractors’ capability of 297	
performing opportunistic behavior explicitly, detailed contractual monitoring would 298	
divert opportunistic actions away from actions codified in the written contract and 299	
increase the frequency of weak form opportunistic behavior. Thus, the following 300	
hypothesis is developed.  301	
Hypothesis 2: Contractual monitoring is positively associated with contractors’ 302	
weak form opportunistic behavior.  303	
 304	
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Contracts may also act as ‘knowledge repositories’ (Mayer and Argyres, 2004) 305	
which facilitate coordination and may reduce the occurrence of weak form 306	
opportunistic behavior. Firstly, coordination clauses specify task assignments in 307	
greater detail, which reduces role ambiguity and cuts down the contractor’s leeway to 308	
undertake opportunistic actions (Argyres et al., 2007). Similarly, contractual 309	
coordination helps to specify how parties should behave over time, curtailing 310	
adaptation problems (Buvik and John, 2000) and leaving little room for opportunistic 311	
interpretation. However, compared to control functions, provisions referring to 312	
coordination function are less externally enforceable, leaving little effect on strong 313	
form opportunistic behavior. 314	
Secondly, researchers have pointed out that the curbing effect of contracts on 315	
opportunistic behavior is enhanced through detailed mutual contacts between the 316	
contract parties (Wuyts and Geyskens, 2005). If a communication framework and the 317	
interface of activities are clearly codified in the contract, the information exchange is 318	
enhanced and the transparency of the relationship is increased (Srinivasan and Brush, 319	
2006). Thus, information asymmetry is reduced, restricting contractors’ capability of 320	
implementing opportunistic behavior (Ali and Larimo, 2016).  321	
More importantly, researchers have pointed out that contract design may 322	
psychologically affect how parties behave in a relationship (Weber et al., 2011). 323	
Unlike contractual control, which focuses on the negative facets of the relationship, 324	
contractual coordination acts as a ‘meeting of the minds’, and provides guidance on 325	
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the positive sides, like common goals and ways to achieve it (Klein Wolthuis et al., 326	
2005). Contractual coordination contributes to the development of goodwill trust. 327	
Because of bounded rationality, contract parties don’t plan for all potential 328	
problems initially (Love et al., 2011), but set the rules of the game in detail by 329	
establishing norms and procedures to coordinate on how to conduct the project. 330	
Increased working details act as a kind of blueprint and reflect both parties’ effort in 331	
elaborating on the contract, sending a signal about their preparation and intention to 332	
be loyal partners (Carson et al., 2006; Klein Wolthuis et al., 2005) to cooperate 333	
efficiently and complete the project smoothly (Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Yang et al., 334	
2012).  335	
Meanwhile, by creating channels through which disagreements will be solved, 336	
coordination provisions help mitigate misunderstandings and enhance mutual 337	
goodwill trust (Malhotra and Lumineau, 2011). Common expectations and goal 338	
congruence help to curb motivation for behaving opportunistically (Dahlstrom and 339	
Nygaard 1999, Kadefors, 2004), especially for actions that are unobservable or not 340	
verifiable by a third party (Lumineau and Quelin, 2012; Srinivasan and Brush, 2006). 341	
Hypothesis 3: Contractual coordination is negatively associated with contractors’ 342	
weak form opportunistic behavior.  343	
 344	
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Method 345	
Sample and data collection 346	
This research used a questionnaire survey to collect data from Chinese 347	
companies in the construction industry. A pilot test using semi-structured, in-depth 348	
interviews with three professors and 11 managers who specialize in contract 349	
management was conducted. Each interview lasted about an hour. These interviewees 350	
affirmed the practical importance of contracts for construction projects and helped the 351	
authors to refine the constructs behind the study and to ascertain the face validity of 352	
the measurements. 353	
The final data collection process lasted about two months. Alumni who majored 354	
in and engaged in contract management were contacted to participate in the survey. 355	
Snowball sampling was also adopted to collect more qualified questionnaires 356	
conveniently. Note that we did not employ a random sampling strategy because for 357	
the unit of analysis, i.e. construction projects, it is difficult to identify the clear 358	
population of sampling. At the same time, comparing to stranger respondents, alumni 359	
have greater sense of responsibility to give detailed and accurate answers to the 360	
survey questions, which is conducive to ensure the quality of the survey data. In total, 361	
362 informants from project owners (the party issuing the contract, including owners 362	
and general contractors as the owners of subcontractors) responded to the electronic 363	
questionnaire, and 295 valid questionnaires were obtained. To ensure the quality of 364	
the dataset, responses completed in less than 240 seconds were further eliminated, 365	
resulting in 262 valid questionnaires as the final sample. The types of project in the 366	
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dataset covered housing, road and bridge, port and waterway, water conservancy, 367	
municipal engineering, energy, telecommunication, industrial projects and others. 368	
Descriptive statistics for the sample including the distribution of working experience 369	
and professional qualification of the respondents and contract price are presented in 370	
Table 1. 371	
In order to reduce the common method variance, the respondents were informed 372	
that their responses would be confidential, only to be used in academic research, and 373	
there was no standard answer for each question in the questionnaire. Harman's 374	
one-factor test was conducted to test for common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 375	
The model fit of one-factor model (χ2/df=8.760, GFI=0.452, RMSEA=0.172, 376	
CFI=0.474, NFI=0.448, TLI=0.419) doesn’t support the common-factor hypothesis, 377	
indicating that common method bias is not a significant problem in this research.  378	
Measurement 379	
Multi-item scales were used to operationalize variables except for control 380	
variables. A 7-point Likert scale with end points of “strongly disagree” and “strongly 381	
agree” was employed for measurement. 382	
Opportunistic behavior 383	
Based on Luo (2006) and Luo et al. (2015), four items were used to measure 384	
strong-form opportunistic behavior. Another four items for weak-form measurement 385	
were derived from those used by John (1984), Parkhe (1993) and Heide et al. (2007), 386	
with appropriate wording modifications to fit the research context. In order to avoid 387	
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social desirability bias of self-reports (Jap and Anderson 2003), respondents were 388	
asked to assess their partner’s behavior. 389	
Complexity of different contractual functions  390	
Contract complexity has been measured in an aggregate way (Poppo and Zenger, 391	
2002) or by counting the total number of terms included in the contract (Lumineau 392	
and Quélin, 2012; Parkhe, 1993). As subtle measurement of contractual complexity is 393	
not available, the authors developed items to measure contractual complexity in 394	
different functions, strictly following the measurement developing procedure 395	
suggested by Churchill (1979). The measurement was based on construct definitions 396	
and existing scales. Conditions of standard forms of construction contract such as the 397	
FIDIC were referred to, making the measurement practicable in construction projects. 398	
Scholars and experts with more than ten years’ experience in contract management 399	
were interviewed to discuss the measurement, item by item, to refine the literal 400	
meaning of the measurement and ensure the face validity.  401	
For the complexity of contractual obligatoriness, items were developed based on 402	
Luo (2002), Wuyts and Geyskens (2005), and Ding et al. (2013). For the complexity 403	
of contractual monitoring, previous works of Heide et al. (2007) and Chen and 404	
Bharadwaj (2009) provided reference. And the work of Lumineau and Quelin (2012) 405	
and Zhang et al. (2016) helped to develop definition and measurement for the 406	
complexity of contractual coordination. 407	
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Goodwill trust  408	
Trust is a complex phenomenon, and it is rather difficult to measure the dynamic 409	
level of trust within a survey. In order to investigate the effect of contractual content 410	
on the level of goodwill trust, this research focuses on the trust level after signing the 411	
contract, rather than after the observation of opportunistic behavior during 412	
construction period. The measurement of goodwill trust was adapted from previous 413	
works. Based on Jiang (2013) and Lui (2004), three items were used to measure the 414	
level of mutual goodwill trust after the signing of the contract. The time point of the 415	
level of goodwill trust is underlined in the questionnaire. 416	
Control variables 417	
Because a contractor’s opportunistic behavior may be influenced by other factors 418	
outside the framework above, additional variables of less interest were incorporated.  419	
Since expectations of continuity is related to both dependent and independent 420	
variables, it is controlled in this research to capture the shadow of the future (Parkhe, 421	
1993; Schepker et al., 2014), measured with the item: “When contracting for this 422	
project, we expect to have further cooperation with this partner in the future.” 423	
Prior collaboration is controlled since it may relate to both dependent variables 424	
and independent variables (Liu et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2014). Thus, it is controlled in 425	
the model and measured by a single item: “Before contracting for this project, how 426	
often was the prior collaboration between your firm and the focal partner?” (Wang et 427	
al., 2017) 428	
21	
Contract price is also controlled as a proxy of project size or project complexity, 429	
as it will influence the complexity of contract (Benaroch et al., 2016; Lu et al., 2016). 430	
Contract type is controlled in this research since it is related to the complexity of 431	
contract and trust (Laan et al., 2012). The informants are requested to choose from 432	
unit price, lump sum, cost plus fee and mixed contract type. 433	
Results and Analysis 434	
Construct reliability and validity 435	
In order to assess the internal consistency and the reliability of the measurement, 436	
Cronbach’s alpha of each construct was examined. The results show that the 437	
Cronbach’s alpha values are all greater than 0.7, indicating good consistency and 438	
reliability. 439	
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was employed to further assess the 440	
construct validity of the measurement. In the CFA model in Amos 22.0, each item was 441	
linked to its corresponding construct, with the construct covariance freely estimated. 442	
The CFA results are shown in Table 2. The model fit indices (χ2/df=1.754, 443	
GFI=0.894, RMSEA=0.054, CFI=0.953, NFI=0.898, TLI=0.944) show an acceptable 444	
fit of the data to the model. Composite reliability (CR) ranges from 0.755 to 0.893 and 445	
average variance extracted (AVE) are all above the 0.5 benchmark (except for 446	
contractual coordination, which is close to 0.5), indicating a good reliability as a 447	
supplement. Together with the factor loadings, which are all above or close to 0.6, 448	
convergent validity was demonstrated. Furthermore, as Table 3 shows, the square 449	
roots of the AVE are greater than the correlations, demonstrating good discriminant 450	
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validity.  451	
Hypotheses testing 452	
Hierarchical regression analysis was employed to analyze the theoretical 453	
framework. The variance inflation factors (VIF) for each variable ranged from 1.073 454	
to 3.243, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern. 455	
Control variables were first introduced into Model 1 and Model 3, with the three 456	
dimensions of contractual complexity being added to the previous ones. As shown by 457	
Model 2 (ΔR2=0.054, p<0.01) and Model 5 (ΔR2=0.051, p<0.01) in Table 4, 458	
contractual complexity does have significant effects on contractors’ opportunistic 459	
behavior. More specifically, Model 2 shows that contractual obligatoriness has a 460	
significant negative effect (β=-0.222, p<0.01) on strong form opportunistic behavior. 461	
Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported. 462	
Model 5 shows that all three dimensions of contractual complexity have 463	
significant effects on contractors’ weak form opportunistic behavior. Specifically, 464	
contractual monitoring has a significant positive impact (β=0.164, p<0.05) on weak 465	
form opportunistic behavior, and contractual coordination has a significant negative 466	
effect (β=-0.168, p<0.05). Consequently, Hypothesis 2 and 3 are supported. 467	
Additional analysis 468	
Apart from the above direct test on the proposed hypotheses, we conducted 469	
several additional analyses to further exploit the information in our dataset. 470	
When developing Hypothesis 2 (contractual monitoring influence weak form 471	
opportunistic behaviors) and Hypothesis 3 (contractual coordination influence weak 472	
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form behaviors), we mainly employed goodwill trust between the collaborating 473	
parties as the reason leading to these relationships. Therefore, here we conduct a 474	
mediation test to examine if goodwill trust act as the underlying mechanism 475	
explaining the relationship in Hypotheses 2 and 3.  476	
As suggested by Baron and Kenny, three conditions are necessary for the 477	
presence of a mediation effect: Firstly, the independent variable should be 478	
significantly related with the dependent variable. Secondly, the independent variable 479	
should significantly affect the mediation variable. Thirdly, when controlling the 480	
influence of the independent variable, the mediator still has a significant effect on the 481	
dependent variable. As for the mediation relationship in this research, the main effects 482	
have already been tested in Model 2 and 5. As Model 8 shows, contractual 483	
coordination has a significant positive relationship (β=0.186, p<0.05) with goodwill 484	
trust, and a marginally positive effect (β=0.140, p<0.1) is found for contractual 485	
monitoring. Furthermore, Model 9 shows a significant impact of goodwill trust on 486	
contractors’ weak form opportunistic behavior after controlling for all contractual 487	
dimensions simultaneously, and a nonsignificant effect of coordination, which 488	
provides evidence for the mediation effect of goodwill trust on the path from 489	
contractual coordination to contractors’ weak form opportunistic behavior.  490	
As the statistical power of the three-step test might be low (Hayes, 2009), 491	
Sobel’s test based on bootstrapping is used to determine whether the indirect effects 492	
of the two dimensions of contractual complexity on contractors’ opportunistic 493	
behavior via goodwill trust are different from zero, especially for the path of 494	
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monitoring. The process1 suggested by Hayes is employed using SPSS 23.0. The Z 495	
value (Z=-3.543, p<0.01) in Sobel’s test confirmed the mediating effect of goodwill 496	
trust between the complexity of contractual coordination and weak form opportunistic 497	
behavior. Meanwhile, the other Sobel’s test indicates a significant indirect effect 498	
(Z=-3.856. p<0.01), suggesting the mediation effect of goodwill trust between the 499	
complexity of contractual monitoring and weak form opportunistic behavior, but in 500	
the negative direction. Taking together the results of the three-step analysis and 501	
Sobel’s test on bootstrapping, we conclude that goodwill trust is a significant 502	
mediator explaining how contractual coordination influence weak form opportunistic 503	
behaviors, while it is not a mediator for the relationship between contractual 504	
monitoring and weak form opportunistic behaviors.  505	
Secondly, we conducted an analysis to explore if the three contractual 506	
mechanisms have interactive effects on contractor’s opportunistic behaviors. We first 507	
centralized the variables “contractual obligatoriness”, “contractual monitoring”, and 508	
“contractual coordination”, and then generated three interaction terms by multiplying 509	
the centralized variables pairwise. Then we incorporated these three interaction terms 510	
into the regression model. The results are shown in Model 3 and Model 6 in Table 4. 511	
It turns out that there is no significant interactive effect of the three contractual 512	
mechanisms on either type of opportunistic behavior, as neither of the interactive 513	
terms in Model 3 or Model 6 is statistically significant. The results indicate that 514	
																																								 																				 	
1 Scholars can download the process for SPSS from the website:	http://afhayes.com/index.html  
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neither of the three mechanisms amplifies or weakens the other two mechanisms’ 515	
influence on opportunistic behaviors. 516	
Thirdly, we pay attention to the potential relationships for which we did not 517	
develop formal hypotheses. For strong form opportunistic behavior, we hypothesize 518	
that contractual obligatoriness will have a negative impact, which implies that we do 519	
not expect significant influence of monitoring and coordination on it. The results in 520	
Model 2 supports this notion (for contractual monitoring, β=0.061, p>0.05; for 521	
contractual coordination β=-0.074, p>0.05). For weak form opportunistic behavior, 522	
we hypothesize that contractual monitoring will have a positive influence, while 523	
contractual coordination will have a negative influence, which implies we expect no 524	
effect of contractual obligatoriness on it. However, Model 5 shows a significant 525	
negative influence of contractual obligatoriness on contractor’s opportunistic 526	
behaviors (β =-0.174, p<0.05). Another related important observation is that 527	
contractual obligatoriness is significantly positively related with goodwill trust (β528	
=0.148, p>0.05). These unexpected results will be further discussed in the next 529	
section.  530	
Discussion and Conclusion 531	
Discussion 532	
As predicted in H1, the complexity of contractual obligatoriness is negatively 533	
related to contractors’ strong form opportunistic behavior. Consistent with the 534	
traditional function of contractual safeguarding, this research has verified that it is the 535	
obligatoriness that acts as the last line of defense in safeguarding investment against 536	
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opportunism. As predicted in H2 and H3, contractual monitoring and coordination 537	
have respective effects on contractors’ weak form opportunistic behavior. The 538	
empirical results echo those of the exploratory work of Lumineau and Quélin (2012). 539	
Previous studies have demonstrated that the contract plays only a limited role in weak 540	
form opportunism since it involves behaviors that are not in breach of the contract 541	
directly (Lu et al., 2016). This research has supplemented those findings by verifying 542	
the curbing effect of contractual coordination on weak form opportunistic behavior. 543	
Moreover, we explored if contractual monitoring and coordination also have 544	
indirect mediated effects on contractors’ weak form opportunistic behavior through 545	
goodwill trust. Consequently, the empirical results show that goodwill trust mediates 546	
the relationship between the complexity of contractual coordination and contractors’ 547	
weak form opportunistic behavior. The empirical result is consistent with the findings 548	
that contractual coordination helps to reduce the level of conflict through 549	
communication and common expectations (Schilke and Lumineau, 2018). This way, 550	
in addition to mitigating performance risks, contractual coordination reflects a social 551	
consensus and acts as reinforcement of specific behaviors or exchange patterns, which 552	
may play the role of relational alleviator in dealing with weak form opportunistic 553	
behavior. However, the mediation effect on the relationship between the complexity 554	
of contractual monitoring and weak form opportunistic behavior is not supported in 555	
the expected direction. From the three-step procedure of the mediation test, it is 556	
obvious to see that contractual monitoring is marginally positively related to goodwill 557	
trust. Previous studies have discussed the contract-trust relationship in a 558	
27	
complementary or substitutive way (Cao and Lumineau, 2014). Specifically, 559	
contractual control may crowd out goodwill trust while contractual coordination may 560	
strengthen goodwill trust (Malhotra and Lumineau, 2011). This research argues that 561	
close monitoring may signal distrust between the contract parties. Nevertheless, there 562	
is no significant negative relationship between contractual monitoring and goodwill 563	
trust. One possible explanation would be that construction projects are commonly 564	
complex and contracts designed to govern these transactions are inevitably complex 565	
and specific.  566	
Finally, as presented in the previous section, we observed an expected negative 567	
relationship between contractual obligatoriness and weak form opportunistic 568	
behaviors. The reason might be due to the positive relationship between contractual 569	
obligatoriness and goodwill trust observed in Model 8. From these results, we suggest 570	
that scholars should be more careful when talk about the relationship between formal 571	
contract and goodwill trust in construction projects. Actually, many scholars argue 572	
that one important drawback of detailed formal contract is that it may signal a level of 573	
distrust, and thus hamper the goodwill between the transacting parties (Ghoshal and 574	
Moran, 1996; Cao and Lumineau, 2015). However, our data shows that in 575	
construction projects, the formal contract instead has a strong direct complementary 576	
effect on goodwill trust. We conjecture that the reason might be that the construction 577	
projects usually have a large amount of contract price. Under such important 578	
transactions (both strategically and financially), the parties will regard detailed 579	
contractual governance mechanisms as understandable and even required, rather than 580	
28	
feeling been distrusted. Furthermore, in such important transactions, the detailed 581	
formal contract can help to ease the worries of the parties about the potential hazards 582	
that overshadow their investments, and thus can build a strong basis for the parties to 583	
in turn construct their goodwill and trustworthiness. Driving by these postulations, we 584	
suggest that this might be an interesting research opportunity to generalize the 585	
conditions (e.g. strategic importance or price) where formal contract complement 586	
goodwill trust instead of hamper it. 587	
Conclusion and Implications 588	
This study attempts to examine the effects of contractual complexity on 589	
contractors’ strong and weak form opportunistic behavior, and also verifies the 590	
mediating role of goodwill trust in construction projects. This research contributes to 591	
the contract management literature and interorganizational relationship governance 592	
literature in the following ways.  593	
Firstly, by answering the question “how does contractual governance matter to 594	
deal with opportunistic behavior”, this research differentiates the effects of distinct 595	
contractual functions on different types of opportunistic behavior. In this way, this 596	
research responds to previous works (Lumineau and Quélin, 2012) and speaks to the 597	
debate regarding the contract-opportunism relationship. It is showed that neither 598	
contractual governance and opportunistic behavior is a single-facet construct, and 599	
investigating in a more nuanced way can help to reconcile the contradictory findings 600	
in the current literature. Secondly, combining the functional view of contracts with the 601	
management control literature, this research divides the control function into 602	
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contractual obligatoriness and monitoring, and show that they are using different 603	
logics in controlling partner’s behavior and have divergent properties that are worth 604	
exploring. Thirdly, this research highlights the salient effect of goodwill trust in 605	
curbing weak form opportunistic behaviors. Previous scholars have suggested, also is 606	
verified by this research, that formal contract has very limited effect in dealing with 607	
weak form opportunism (Lumineau and Quelin, 2012). Given the implicit nature of 608	
weak form opportunistic behaviors, this research suggests that the best strategy to deal 609	
with them is to reduce the motivation to behave opportunistically rather than limiting 610	
the ability. Therefore, it is necessary to further explore the important role of relational 611	
governance mechanisms in curbing weak form opportunism.  612	
This research also has managerial implications. Firstly, it provides guidance for 613	
contract designing, since the results confirm that later problems can be mitigated by 614	
doing things differently at the “front end” (Parkhe, 1993). Conventional wisdom 615	
posits that managers should design more explicit contracts to curb both parties’ 616	
opportunistic behavior. However, this research indicates that construction companies 617	
should be cautious in using different contractual functions. On the one hand, the 618	
binding force of the contract should be strengthened appropriately to generate 619	
deterrent force through obligatoriness. On the other hand, managers should pay 620	
attention to monitoring-based contractual provisions which have the potential of 621	
nurturing contractors’ opportunistic behavior in weak form. It does not imply that 622	
monitoring is not necessary in construction projects, but suggests avoiding intensive 623	
use of monitoring-based contents and that monitoring alone is not enough. Owners 624	
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should let coordination go with them to reduce weak form opportunism from 625	
motivation. At the same time, penalty-related contents should be added to monitoring 626	
functions to curb opportunism from capability. Therefore, in line with the goal of 627	
mitigating weak form opportunism, maybe owners are suggested to leave more room 628	
for contractors and for coordination. What’s more, since the improvement process of 629	
contracting may curb opportunistic behavior in some ways, learning from previous 630	
contracts, especially failed ones, is encouraged for owners. Secondly, contract 631	
managers should keep a weather eye on practical behaviors or conflicts derived from 632	
opportunism and employ pointed mechanism. With regard to mitigating contractors’ 633	
weak form opportunistic behavior, which takes place more frequently according to the 634	
statistical data, relational governance like trust is more preferable. Coordination 635	
efforts or shared norms should be developed and enhanced through contracts or 636	
someway else in dealing with this type of opportunistic behavior, which is less 637	
observable but more durable (Luo et al., 2015).  638	
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 639	
This study has several limitations that provide avenues for further research. 640	
Firstly, this research regards contractual complexity as a single characteristic of 641	
governance and doesn’t take into consideration the matching between project features 642	
and contractual complexity. This research has considered control variables like 643	
contract price as a proxy of project features. Future studies are encouraged to learn 644	
about how different combinations of transactional characteristics are best matched 645	
with different combinations of contractual provisions in dealing with opportunism. 646	
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Secondly, the companies in which the informants work are mainly large engineering 647	
enterprises in China, whose level of contract management or performance of projects 648	
may be higher than the average. Although this research has employed contract price 649	
as a control variable, it is suggested to sampling from small-scale projects as well and 650	
consider the relationship between the key constructs in a larger variation of project 651	
scales. Thirdly, learning effect may make the contracts more and more complex to 652	
recoup loss from opportunistic behavior due to incompleteness of previous contracts. 653	
And the level of trust is also dynamic. However, cross-sectional sample design 654	
constrains the capacity to carefully examine the relationship between contractual 655	
complexity, trust and opportunistic behavior. Thus, longitudinal data or experimental 656	
methods are needed to fully test the dynamics of this relationship. Finally, this 657	
research did not use instrumental variables to formally address the potential 658	
endogeneity issue. As the contractual mechanisms are not designed randomly, the 659	
independent and dependent variables of this research may be influenced 660	
simultaneously by some missing variables. Although we deliberately controlled the 661	
influence of expectations of continuity, prior collaboration, and contract price because 662	
they may relate to both contractual design and opportunistic behaviors, the potential 663	
endogeneity issue might nevertheless limit the contribution of this research.  664	
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